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A B S T R A C T
Strategy, structure and rivalry across an industry has an impact upon innovation outcomes at the industry level.
However, when patterns of rivalry are altered through the presence of strategic networks (sets of firms that
cooperate closely on the basis of their web of strategic alliances) it is not clear what impact this has upon product
market (price) competition and in factor markets (patents). Using data from the motor vehicle industry, we find
only limited support for the notion that competitive responses vary with changes in network-level rivalry most
likely due to co-opetition and a lack of stability across the networks. The results suggest that firms are likely to
engage in co-opetition, thus changes in innovation outcomes can only be observed at the network level. When
the presence of strong strategic networks leads to lower levels of rivalry on the basis of at least some cooperative
behavior within the network (and competitive actions being focused on firms in other networks) we see a
reduction in innovation at the network level. However, as the strategic networks changed consistently over time,
the change in patenting behavior was limited.
1. Introduction
Innovation is often positioned as the backbone for both firm com-
petitiveness as well as regional economic growth (e.g. Bristow &
Healy, 2018; Hashi & Stojčić, 2013 Hauser et al., 2018; Walker, Chen &
Aravind, 2015). Given this critical role of innovation in the modern
economy, considerable research across multiple levels of analysis has
investigated how and when innovation occurs. For example, when
looking at the economy as a totality, institutional economics highlights
the role of institutions in determining economic choices. Thus, the
regulatory environment, political systems and social structures impact
investment in innovation across an economy (Coase, 1998;
North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). At the more micro end of the spec-
trum, dynamic capabilities with its grounding in Schumpeterian eco-
nomics considers how different positions, paths and processes may help
firms build new capabilities to adapt to rapidly changing environments
(Teece, Pisano & Schuen, 1997, Teece, 2007; Winter, 2003). These
dynamic capabilities form a foundation for innovation within firms as
they adapt to new or altered environments.
Between these economy-level and firm-level perspectives sits the
role of industry – sets of firms that provide similar products or services
to a set of customers. Industry structures (e.g. number of players) and
industry dynamics (e.g. the manner in which these firms compete for
customers) may also impact upon the speed and scope of innovation
across these sets of firms. Porter (1990) for example, recognized that
vigorous domestic rivalry within an industry is critical in improving
internal efficiencies and also fosters the research that underpins future
innovation. Without a minimum level of rivalry, both innovation and
growth may be hampered (Carlin, Schaffer & Seabright, 2004) and
hence most countries have some form of anti-trust or anti-monopoly
legislation to ensure that industries are not dominated by oligopolies or
monopolies that may dampen the drive for innovation. This paper
considers innovation through this industry-level lens and how changing
patterns of rivalry on the basis of strategic networks within industries
may impact innovation.
Strategic networks are sets of firms within an industry that exhibit
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120253
Received 31 August 2019; Received in revised form 7 August 2020; Accepted 10 August 2020
⁎ Corresponding author. Phone: +61 406 434 760
E-mail addresses: p.galvin@ecu.edu.au (P. Galvin), n.burton@northumbria.ac.uk (N. Burton), pjsingh@unimelb.edu.au (P.J. Singh),
David.Sarpong@brunel.ac.uk (D. Sarpong), Norbert.Bach@tu-ilmenau.de (N. Bach), s.teo@ecu.edu.au (S. Teo).
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 161 (2020) 120253
0040-1625/ © 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
T
denser strategic linkages among themselves relative to the links that
they may have to other firms within the same industry. These alliances
may form for a variety of reasons. From a supply-side perspective, firms
seek to build their resources – especially those that may enhance their
capacity to innovate such as joint R&D efforts, sharing technology,
patenting agreements, sharing critical technology and/or knowledge
(Contractor & Lorange, 1988). Firms may also pursue strategic net-
works that can be explained via a demand-side logic whereby firms
avoid head-to-head competition with all players and instead move to a
more directed form of competition whereby rivalrous actions are di-
rected towards members of other strategic networks and not towards
firms within their own focal network (Gimeno, 2004).
The presence of strategic networks coordinating the behavior of
groups of firms within an industry runs counter to the neoclassical
economics assumptions that firms compete in a relatively homogeneous
manner for the same (rare) resources or for the same markets/custo-
mers (McPherson, 1983). Prior research concerning industry dynamics
already recognizes that an individual firm may compete more with
some firms and less with other firms on the basis of market overlap,
resource homogeneity or mutual dependence between firms (Chuang
et al., 2018, Guedri & McGuire, 2011). The development of various
strategic networks of firms across an industry where these firms may
collaborate and limit their engagement in direct head-to-head compe-
tition presents an additional logic for non-homogeneous patterns of
competition. One of the outcomes of this potentially reduced level of
rivalry may be a reduced level of investment in innovation as one form
of competitive response to potentially reduced rivalry. Certainly, the
emergence of identifiable strategic networks suggests that ‘[t]he image
of atomistic actors competing for profits against each other in an im-
personal marketplace is increasingly inadequate in a world in which
firms are embedded in networks … with other individual and organi-
zational actors’ (Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 2000: 205). Thus, if firm-
based competition is somewhat superseded by competition at the net-
work level (ie networks of firms within an industry compete against
other networks), it is not clear how this phenomena may impact the
intensity of rivalry in an industry and the competitive actions under-
taken by firms within the industry.
Rivalry within an industry may take a number of forms. Competitive
rivalry may occur in product markets where firms compete for custo-
mers and the economic surplus that sales of goods and services to these
customers may produce. Firms may also compete in factor markets for
resources (such as skilled labor) which may allow the firm to subse-
quently produce superior goods and services or achieve greater levels of
efficiency. In terms of Porter's (1980) generic strategies, inter-firm
competition may play out in terms of cost structure and the subsequent
pricing of goods or services (ie firms seek to compete on the basis of
price), or firms may compete on the basis of non-price attributes to
create a position of differentiation through such means as brand re-
cognition, innovation associated with the product, warranty or avail-
ability. More intense rivalry results in firms seeking to more clearly
define their competitive response such as become a clear price-oriented
competitor, or further differentiate through increased innovation.
Overall, we are witnessing a growth in strategic alliances to the
point where in some industries, we observe strategic networks acting as
a coordination mechanism for competitive behavior. As firm versus firm
competition starts to become superseded by network versus network
competition, we are interested in how changes in rivalry at the network
level impacts firms’ competitive behaviour. Specifically do changes in
rivalry between networks impact the extent to which a firm prioritizes
innovation (as measured through lagged patent data) and competitive
pricing in the form of price discounting, thereby providing insight for
policy makers? To consider how rivalry between strategic networks
impacts these competitive behaviors we draw upon data from the motor
vehicle industry as one that features strategic networks and extensive
use of patenting and price discounting.
2. Strategic networks, Rivalry and Innovation
Innovation has often been held up as the holy grail of economic
development (Fagerberg & Srholec, 2008). At the level of a regional
economy, it tends to be dependent upon a range of contextual variables
including institutional factors and the political system (Kashani &
Roshani, 2019). However, at the industry level, competition and rivalry
have been linked with higher levels of innovation across an industry
(Athreye, 2001; Carlin et al., 2004). In this paper, we shift our attention
to how changing patterns in rivalrous behavior between firms on the
basis of strategic alliances may impact innovation outcomes.
Starting with inter-firm rivalry, the field of competitive dynamics
considers when and how firms engage in specific competitive actions
and reactions (Andrevski, et al., 2016; Baum & Korn, 1996). In essence,
how do firms alter their behaviour in response to competitors’ actions
and what form do these responses take? The focus of much of the re-
search to date has been on the likelihood of response, the number and
speed of responses and the extent or severity of the response (Chen &
Miller, 2012). Empirically, the competitive responses that have been
considered have focused on a firm's entry into new markets, or at least
new market segments, or major price initiatives (e.g. Ferrier &
Lee, 2002; Chen & Miller, 1994).
To date, the competitive dynamics literature has generally not ac-
counted for close relationships between particular firms through stra-
tegic alliances and how these relationships may impact the action and
reaction of firms that forms the central theme within competitive dy-
namics. Rather, literature pertaining to competitive dynamics relies
upon neoclassical economics assumptions of firms as atomistic entities
that act in their own self-interest. Thus, how strong strategic alliances
(and thus strategic networks) may affect firm-level competitive re-
sponses is an understudied concern within this research stream (Chen &
Miller, 2012).
Research that has considered strategic networks has primarily fo-
cused upon the structure and nature of these networks (Jacob &
Duysters, 2017). Initial work at the network level (as opposed to the
dyadic level) considered the structure of the industry in which networks
occur, the shape or structure of the networks and the role or importance
of central players in these networks (Arino-Martin & Garcia-Pont, 1998;
Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Skilton & Bernardes, 2015). The other key
theme has centered on the formation of networks and how the alliance
choices of one firm impacted the alliances choices of others. For ex-
ample, in the airline industry firms may respond to rivals’ alliance
networks by establishing alliances with their rivals’ partners or estab-
lishing countervailing alliances (Gimeno, 2004).
Looking specifically at rivalry between strategic networks and the
potential for firms to alter their behaviour on the basis of this network
level rivalry, Boyd (2004) found that the strategic networks identified
in the airline industry offered some limited predictive ability to account
for patterns of rivalry, and Zhang and Zhang (2006) found that com-
plementary alliances between members of the major strategic alliance
blocks in the industry helped to explain certain competitive behaviors
such as expanding output. Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven (2001)
suggested that rivalry occurs between blocks of firms fighting for
market acceptance in respect of technical standards.
To appreciate why rivalry may occur at a network level, firms may
seek collaborative advantage (Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Dyer &
Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006) through collaborative activity that reduces
rivalry and minimizes the application of market power by upstream or
downstream industries. On this basis, firms within strategic networks
may move away from rivalry being enacted by individual firms ac-
cording to the traditional mechanisms of direct confrontation in factor
and product markets, and instead manage rivalry via the collaborative
orchestration between a number of participants or network members
(Chung, 1993; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Haugland and Gronhaug, 1996;
Vanherbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001). Of course, this notion of co-
ordinated actions occurring across a network assumes that individual
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firms within each network are able to effectively align their actions.
This is certainly possible in cases where there is some form of over-
arching governance structure for the network. However, in cases where
this does not exist, the loosely coupled nature of such a network means
firm behavior within the network will be impacted by the level of
(structural, relational and cognitive) embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997). Firms
then engage in a process of sensemaking on the basis of other firms
actions and signalling to other firms in the network themselves
(Simsek, Lubatkin & Floyd, 2003). In addition, direct communication
may occur as part of alliance negotiation or through the informal per-
sonal networks of people engaging with partner firms through the al-
liances in place.
3. Rivalry and competitive actions
Competition sits at the heart of business strategy and draws upon
the notion of contested goals (Porter, 1979). Where two or more firms
seek a single goal (such as the sale of a product to a customer) these
firms are engaged in competition (Medlin & Ellegard, 2015). Thus, the
nature of rivalry within an industry in terms of who competes with who
and the manner by which they compete is a central concern for both
strategy theorists and practitioners alike given that competition tends
to be a powerful motivator and significant driver of behaviour (Ford &
Håkansson, 2013).
Theoretical conceptualizations of rivalry and how it may play out
across an industry have emerged from a variety of perspectives in-
cluding oligopoly theory (Shapiro, 1989), game theory
(Camerer, 1991), competitive dynamics or ‘warfare’ models (Chen &
Miller, 2012) and industrial organization economics (Porter, 1980). All
of these approaches recognize that inter-firm rivalry is based upon
specific competitive actions and reactions. The precise actions and re-
actions may vary considerably and involve competition in both product
and factor markets, though empirically, most studies have tended to
focus their attention on the product market side of the equation in
terms of changes in pricing of goods and services, or entry (or exit) into
new markets (Chen & Miller, 2012). Consistent choices of this nature
represent a firm's strategy.
Any changes in strategy are underpinned by the existing stock of
resources and capabilities, along with the firm's capacity to reconfigure
these capabilities. This capacity to evolve and adapt to changing en-
vironments is driven by a firm's dynamic capabilities (Arndt &
Pierce, 2018). Whether these dynamic capabilities emerge through the
process of learning (Zollo & Winter, 2002) or via managerial or en-
trepreneurial capacity (Zahra, Sapienza & Davidsson, 2006), they allow
firms to reconfigure their resources and capabilities to create hetero-
geneous positions within product markets (Burton and Galvin, 2020).
This transformational process (Rice et al., 2015) allows firms to alter
their competitive responses to changing rivalry between firms. For ex-
ample, becoming more price competitive via increasing efficiencies or
other factors that may help firms reduce their cost structure requires
changes in their operating routines through learning or experimenting
with new processes. Similarly, innovation as a basis for differentiation
is driven by organizational learning whereby the accumulation of ex-
perience and knowledge from existing processes provides a basis for the
creation of new knowledge on the basis of both individual and orga-
nizational learning (Nonaka, 1994).
Overall, changes in rivalry across an industry will drive some form
of competitive response. Exactly what this response will in part be
determined by the dominant competitive actions and reactions within
the industry, but the options for change are path dependent
(Teece, Pisano & Schuen, 1997) as firms are not only constrained by
their stock of resources and capabilities, but by their capabilities to
change and adapt in different ways. Thus some firms may continually
adapt their market presence through innovation to deliver a combina-
tion of new product and service releases (substantive and tangible
changes in the market offerings of firms) or they may seek to transform
their internal operations or their supply chains to achieve lower cost
structures (Galvin, Rice & Liao, 2014; 2015).
Linking these adaptions on the part of firms back to the industry
level and changing industry conditions, Porter's (1980) Five Forces
model suggests that high levels of rivalry will result in aggressively
targeting competitor's markets, often through price-based competition.
Competing on the basis of price is not positioned as an attractive option,
but in cases of low levels of differentiation, low diversity of competi-
tors, high exit costs, a high proportion of fixed costs and numerous
competitors, firms revert to price-based competition. In the longer-
term, price-based competition will be detrimental to a firm's profit-
ability (Shapiro, 1989), however, in terms of actions and reactions,
price discounting remains a common feature of increasing rivalry –
especially where firms lack the capacity to change their competitive
response on the basis of existing capabilities and where opportunities
for differentiation are limited.
At the strategic network level, extrapolating the concept that in-
creased rivalry between firms will lead to increases in competitive ac-
tions by firms, we apply this logic to strategic networks of firms. As the
level of rivalry between different strategic networks increases (ie firm
versus firm competition is superseded by network versus network
competition) we expect that individual firms will react with price re-
ductions across products that compete with the products of those firms
that make up other strategic networks. That is, competitive actions
(such as increasing production) that lead to increased rivalry will lead
to a reaction in the form of price discounting. Specifically, we hy-
pothesise:
H1. There is a positive association between strategic network rivalry
and price discounting of products that compete directly with products
from other strategic networks.
If price discounting is a competitive response of rivalry in respect of
product markets, then seeking to outperform competitors in factor
markets as a basis for pursuing a differentiation strategy – as per
Porter's (1980) generic strategies – represents an alternative response to
another firm's competitive action. Avoiding head-to-head competition
on the basis of price, and instead building a competitive position
around differentiation through superior resources such as brand equity,
distribution channels, product design, superior performance or the like
is perhaps a longer-term, but more sustainable approach to competi-
tion. Thus whilst differentiation as a generic strategy may be achieved
via a number of means, of these various potential reactions that will
address a firm's competitive position, building superior innovative
products on the basis of patents is relatively easily quantified and is
therefore the specific reaction we consider in respect of increasing
rivalry between strategic networks. We hypothesize:
H2. There is a positive association between the measure of rivalry
between strategic networks and (lagged) patenting activities.
Pricing decisions pertain to specific market segments and must be
made by specific firms. For example, a strategic network featuring firms
selling products into four market segments A, B, C and D may find itself
subject to increased rivalry courtesy of a another strategic network
where the firms reduce prices or increase production levels across some
market segments. The responding strategic network itself does not de-
crease prices, but rather individual firms in the network may drop some
prices where their products go head-to-head in specific market seg-
ments. For example, one firm may drop its prices for products in market
segments A and B, whereas another firm may drop its prices for product
being sold in market segments C and D to specifically target the actions
of the firm from the opposing strategic network.
Similarly, patenting behaviour is measured at the firm level.
However, while patents may be registered at the firm-level, they may
benefit multiple firms (or even all firms) within a strategic network.
Strategic networks are defined by the multiple, strong relationships
between firms within the network. Many of the strategic alliances in a
network are built around R&D sharing and technology sharing
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alliances. Others may see R&D sharing in return for other benefits such
as market access. As such, we proposed a further hypothesis that con-
siders patenting as a reaction, but at the network level rather than the
firm level. That is, not all firms need to increase their patenting activity
as long as the total patenting activity increases across the strategic
network as a totality as a reaction to increases in network rivalry.
H3. There is a positive association between the measure of rivalry
between strategic networks and the (lagged) patenting activities by
each strategic network.
4. Methods
To test the hypotheses, data was collected from the automotive in-
dustry for the period 1993–2007. Known for its extensive use of stra-
tegic alliances (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007), the auto industry also
features high levels of rivalry across many segments of the industry and
the high level of fixed costs incurred by manufacturers has led to a
number of instances of price discounting by many players–particularly
during periods of reduced demand. These difficult competitive condi-
tions have led to some consolidation of the industry through M&A ac-
tivity, though profitability remains variable (as overtly seen through
the ‘bail-out’ of the three largest US-based manufacturers in 2009).
For analysis purposes, data was collected for 13 market segments
comprising the light vehicle automotive industry in the USA for the
period 1993 to 2007 from the Ward's Automotive Yearbooks with the
data being collected biannually (e.g. 1993, 1995, 1997 etc.). We ac-
cepted the definition of the industry that Wards have presented, in-
cluding those firms that they deem to be included versus those that
have been excluded. Information was also collated on inter-firm re-
lationships from How the World's Automakers are Related for the same
timeframe. The sample included 19 firms. Whilst our theory discussion
and the subsequent hypotheses discuss firms, these firms compete via
vehicle models designed for different segments within the market. Thus
to investigate with whom Ford competes most vigorously, it is neces-
sary to look at the different models produced by Ford for different
market segments and ascertain the competitive rivalry in each of these
segments (via the particular model in question) relative to the models
being produced by competitors in each market segment.
4.1. Classifying Strategic Networks
Current strategic network literature suggests the strategic network
concept bears close association with what has been referred to in the
literature as ‘strategic blocks’ (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991), and ‘alli-
ance blocks’ (Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001). However, under-
lying these apparent similarities are significant methodological differ-
ences which distinguish the concepts of strategic blocks from strategic
networks. The core difference lies in the structure of the resulting col-
lective of firms; while strategic blocks associate firms together who
share positional equivalence (firms who share in same relative position
and relationships within the context of a network to other firms who
may or may not be in the same relational network within an industry),
strategic networks conversely are firms that are either directly or in-
directly related to each other based on the presence of direct or indirect
strategic relationships (Jussila, Mainela & Nätti, 2016; Nohria & Garcia-
Pont, 1991).
As the presence (or absence) of strategic relationships between firms
is of central importance in the formation of strategic networks, the
nature and strength of relations (ties) between actors or agents (nodes)
is pivotal to defining meaningful strategic networks. The spectrum of
strategic relationships that can exist between firms is extensive and
ranges from distribution and marketing arrangements to cross-equity
holdings. As the degree to which different alliance types impacts upon
the strategic decision making of the firm, differentiating between dif-
ferent alliance types and weighting them appropriately is critical. For
the purposes of determining the interdependencies that may exist be-
tween otherwise atomistic firms, non-directional relationships were
valued according to the scoring system used by Nohria and Garcia-
Pont (1991) – which itself was adapted from the prior work of
Contractor and Lorange (1988). In instances where firms exhibited
more than a single relationship between partners, the highest scoring
relationship was used. Inter-reliability tests were performed on the
classifications generated for each strategic relationship as reported
qualitatively in Ward's Interrelationship Guide on a random sample of
relationship descriptions, resulting in a 79.23% mean result. While
production and price data was only available for the US market, our
alliance database covered provided global coverage of alliances and
thus our networks feature firms (such as Chinese manufacturers) that
do not compete in the US market.
The valued relationship data of all firms was entered into a n x n
matrix configuration for each period of analysis. Each cell Sij indicated
the strength of the relationship between nodes i and j, with the value of
‘10’ ascribed Firm A x Firm A to indicate that the strongest relationship
held by any firm was that of the firm to itself. Each matrix S was
symmetrical (Sij = Sji) due to the non-directionality of the valued re-
lations, aside from the diagonal values of ‘10’ assigned Firm A x Firm A
(Scott, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1999).
A number of alternative methods exist by which to identify cohesive
subsets in data, however, many of these approaches elicit restrictive
limitations to the ultimate identification of groupings that can nega-
tively impact on meaningful results and later analysis. It is important to
note that no definitive methodological approach exists by which to
analyze valued non-directional network data, therefore it was necessary
to run a range of procedures (clique, n-clique, n-clan, cluster, factions,
components, K-Plex and K-Core) to determine the most appropriate
method to employ. After running a range of possible alternatives, the
use of Johnson's Hierarchical Clustering Procedure (1967) was ulti-
mately determined to provide the most representative outcomes and
finds precedent in the previous work on networks completed by
Lazzarini (2007). To overcome the limitations associated with both the
use of single link and complete link methods, the criteria of average
linkage was employed (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). All modeling was
performed via UCInet (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002). The re-
sulting strategic networks are shown in Table 1.
4.2. The Measurement of Rivalry
Whilst rivalry forms a central concern within strategy research,
there are not well accepted measures for the construct. The Herfindahl
Index, a measure of concentration ratios, has in some instances pro-
vided an effective measure of inferred rivalry in the context of parti-
cular studies. Within this study, a modified version of the Herfindahl
Index was employed to capture variances in sales of vehicles in the
United States at the level of the product market segment. Drawing on
the work of Cool and Dierickx (1993), the use of this modified version
of the Herfindahl Index finds precedent in measuring the differences
observed in rivalry by excluding a firm's own market share from the
overall industry market segment Herfindahl. This measure was also
successfully employed by Durisin and Von Krogh (2005) to study group
level effects in investment banking. Using this approach, ‘a negative
correlation between this rivalry index and return suggests that firms
adversely affect each other's profits; conversely, a positive correlation
indicates the absence of rivalry’ (Cool and Dierickx, 1993: 50).
To create an aggregate rivalry measure, the level of rivalry can be
assessed between networks in each market segment, to determine if
network structures facilitate competitive outcomes. To determine the
level of rivalry a firm faced in a given market segment the Herfindahl
score was subtracted from the overall market segment Herfindahl.
Specifically, the aggregate measure of rivalry, RIVj, was computed for
each firm j as:
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= ∑ =RIV w RIV i segments; 1, 13j i ij ij
with
wij = the ratio of the sales of firm j in segment i to its overall sales
(segment weight)
RIVij = the rivalry index for firm j in segment i (segment rivalry),
i.e., the overall segment Herfindahl from which the squared segment
share of firm j has been subtracted.
RIVij measures the rivalry a firm faces from all other firms in seg-
ment i. This index can be disaggregated to distinguish rivalry from firms
belonging to other strategic networks. This rivalry measure RIVjb (be-
tween network rivalry) was calculated as follows:
= ∑ =RIV w RIV i segments; 1, 13jw i ij ij
w
= ∑ =RIV w RIV i segments; 1, 13jb i ij ij
b
with
RIVijw = the within network rivalry index for firm j in segment i
(i.e., summed over all members of firm j's strategic network, except
firm j).
RIVijb = the between network rivalry index for firm j in segment i
(i.e., summed over all firms not in the strategic network of firm j).
Based on this formula, the level of rivalry experienced by firms in
the United States Light Vehicles Industry was determined. Based on the
networks determined for each year covered by this study, a between
network rivalry measure was computed. The rivalry index mean is 0.083
Table 1
Strategic Networks in the Motor Vehicle Industry (1993-2007)
1993
Network 1 BMW, CARROZZERIA BERTONE, DAIHATSU, DONGFENG AUTO, FIAT spa, GUANGZHOU, INDUSTRIE PININFARINA, PEUGEOT CITROEN, TIANJIN
Network 2 AO AVTOVAZ, BEIJING AUTOMOBILE WORKS, CHINA MOTOR CO, CHRYSLER DAIMLER, HONDA, HYUNDAI, MITSUBISHI, PORSCHE, PROTON, SSANGYONG
Network 3 DAEWOO, FIRST AUTO WORKS, FORD, FUJI (SUBARU), GM, ISUZU, KIA, MARUTI, MAZDA, NISSAN, RENAULT, SUZUKI, TOYOTA, VOLKSWAGEN
1995
Network 1 BEIJING AUTOMOBILE WORKS, CHINA MOTOR CO., CHRYSLER, HONDA, HYUNDAI GROUP, LOTUS, MITSUBISHI, PROTON
Network 2 BMW, CARROZZERIA BERTONE spa, DAIHATSU, GHANGZHOU, INDUSTRIE PININFARINA spa, KIA, TIANJIN
Network 3 DAEWOO, DONGFENG AUTO, FIAT spa, FORD, FUJI (SUBARU), GM, ISUZU, MARUTI, MAZDA, NISSAN, PEUGEOT CITROEN, RENAULT, SUZUKI, TOYOTA
Network 4 AO AVTOVAZ, DAIMLER, FIRST AUTO WORKS, PORSCHE, SHANGHAI AUTO, SSANGYONG, VOLKSWAGEN
1997
Network 1 BMW, CHRYSLER, DAIMLER, FIAT spa, FORD, FUJI (SUBARU), GM, HONDA, ISUZU, MARUTI, MAZDA, MITSUBISHI, NISSAN, PEUGEOT CITROEN, RENAULT,
SUZUKI, TOYOTA
Network 2 DAIHATSU, HYUNDAI, KIA, SSANGYONG, TIANJIN
Network 3 AO AVTOVAZ, CHINA MOTOR CO., DONGFENG AUTO, GHANGZHOU, INDUSTRIE PININFARINA spa GROUP, LOTUS, PROTON
Network 4 BEIJING AUTO, CARROZZERIA BERTONE spa, DAEWOO, FIRST AUTO WORKS, PORSCHE, SHANGHAI AUTO, VOLKSWAGEN
1999
Network 1 HYUNDAI, KIA GROUP, LOTUS, PROTON, SAMSUNG
Network 2 CHINA MOTOR CO., DAIHATSU, GUANGZHOU, TIANJIN
Network 3 CHRYSLER, DAIMLER BENZ, FIAT spa, FORD, FUJI (SUBARU), GM, HONDA, ISUZU, MAZDA, MITSUBISHI, NISSAN, PEUGEOT CITROEN, RENAULT, SUZUKI,
TOYOTA
Network 4 AO AVTOVAZ, BEIJING AUTOMOBILE WORKS, DONGFENG AUTO, INDUSTRIE PININFARINA spa MARUTI
Network 5 BMW, CARROZZERIA BERTONE spa, DAEWOO, FIRST AUTO WORKS, PORSCHE, SHANGHAI AUTO, SSANGYONG, VOLKSWAGEN
2001
Network 1 FIAT spa, FORD, FUJI (SUBARU), GUANGZHOU, GM, HONDA, ISUZU, MARUTI, MAZDA, NISSAN, SUZUKI
Network 2 BMW, BEIJING AUTOMOBILE WORKS, CHRYSLER, DAIMLER BENZ, DAIHATSU, TINAJIN, TOYOTA
Network 3 CARROZZERIA BERTONE spa, DAEWOO, INDUSTRIE PININFARINA spa, SSANGYONG
Network 4 CHINA MOTOR CO. GROUP, LOTUS, MITSUBISHI, PROTON
Network 5 AO AVTOVAZ, FIRST AUTO WORKS, PORSCHE, SHANGHAI AUTO, VOLKSWAGEN
Network 6 Dongfeng Auto, Hyundai, Kia, Peugeot Citroen, Renault
2003
Network 1 Bmw, Beijing Automobile Works, Chrysler, Daimler Benz, Fiat Spa, Ford, Fuji (Subaru), Gm, Hyundai, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Peugeot Citroen, Renault, Suzuki,
Toyota
Network 2 Ao Avtovaz, Carrozzeria Bertone Spa Group, Lotus, Maruti, Udyog Proton
Network 3 Daewoo, First Auto Works, Industrie Pininfarina Spa, Porsche, Shanghai Auto, Ssangyong, Tianjin, Volkswagen
Network 4 China motor co., daihatsu, dongfeng auto, guangzhou, honda, isuzu, kia
2005
Network 1 AO AVTOVAZ, CHRYSLER, DAEWOO, DAIMLER BENZ, FIAT spa, FUJI (SUBARU), GM, INDUSTRIE PININFARINA spa, SHANGHAI AUTO, SUZUKI
Network 2 BEIJING AUTOMOBILE WORKS, CHINA MOTOR CO., HYUNDAI, KIA GROUP, LOTUS, PROTON
Network 3 BMW, CARROZZERIA BERTONE spa,PORSCHE, SSANGYONG, VOLKSWAGEN
Network 4 DONGFENG AUTO, GUANGZHOU, HONDA, ISUZU, MITSUBISHI, NISSAN, PEUGEOT CITROEN, RENAULT, TOYOTA
Network 5 DAIHATSU, FIRST AUTO WORKS, FORD, MARUTI, MAZDA, TIANJIN
2007
Network 1 DONGFENG AUTO, FUJI (SUBARU), GUANGZHOU, HONDA, ISUZU, MITSUBISHI, NISSAN, PEUGEOT CITROEN, RENAULT, TOYOTA
Network 2 AO AVTOVAZ, CARROZZERIA BERTONE spa, DAEWOO, FIAT spa, FORD, GM, INDUSTRIE PININFARINA spa, MARUTI, SHANGHAI AUTO, SSANGYONG, SUZUKI
Network 3 BMW, BEIJING AUTOMOBILE WORKS, CHINA MOTOR CO., CHRYSLER, DAIMLER BENZ, HYUNDAI, KIA
Network 4 Daihatsu, First Auto Works Group, Lotus, Mazda, Porsche, Proton, Tianjin, Volkswagen
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(std. dev. = 0.174).
As the hypotheses focus on ‘increases’ in rivalry we compare the
rivalry measure at t+1 with the same measure at t via the formula t+1 / t
such that a score of greater than 1.0 shows an increase in rivalry re-
lative to the previous period and a score of less than 1.0 shows a de-
crease in rivalry.
4.3. Price and Patent Measures
Price data was collected for each different model within each dif-
ferent market segment. As vehicle models change, are added or dropped
from a manufacturer's line-up, price data was not available for all
models. Akin to the way we considered the change in rivalry, we used
the same approach to compare the price in the more recent year relative
to the previous list price (t+1 relative to t). As the data was biannual,
there were price increases in almost all cases. For each manufacturer we
averaged the price differentials for each vehicle model for which data
was available.
Patent data was acquired through a German government patent
office with the data covering the global patenting activities of each
firm. We considered only patents submitted and not those granted and
the process of granting a patent may take a number of years. As a
greater investment in R&D to react to increased rivalry will not be
immediate, we used lagged data. Patent data is often problematic on a
number of fronts. Often patents are submitted by subsidiary organiza-
tions under different names (thereby reducing the visible patent count),
or firms that are diversified (e.g. Suzuki also manufacture motorcycles
and outboard marine engines) may overstate the relevant patent count.
For some organizations, the motor vehicles operations are clearly dis-
tinct (eg Mitsubishi Motors is separate from Mitsubishi Electric,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries etc.) but this is not always the case. By
looking at sequential time periods to assess the change in patenting
activity (ie the patent count at t+1 relative to t) we look at relative
growth or decline in this variable and thus potentially limit the impact
of over- and understated patent counts by firms as the entity is likely to
file patents in a consistent manner over time.
5. Results
The unit of analysis for the purpose of analysing the data is the firm
and for the period of the study data we ran data on 16 firms. We re-
moved Kia, Peugeot and Daewoo from the sample as each firm con-
trolled less than one percent of the market in any select year and thus
had the potential to throw the rivalry measure given we use a con-
centration derived measure.
Analysis for each hypothesis was undertaken using a Pearson cor-
relation that considered the correlation between average changes in
vehicle model prices per manufacturer and changes in the between
network rivalry measure from the perspective of each manufacturer
(hypothesis one) and changes in patent application counts across se-
quential time periods and the same rivalry measure (hypothesis two).
For the third hypothesis, it was not possible to look at changes in rivalry
and changes in patenting as the analysis required correlating a cumu-
lative between network rivalry score (one score for each network) with
the cumulative patent count for the same network. As the networks
varied, it was not appropriate to consider changes in network rivalry as
the size and composition varied each time period. The same applies to
patent count. All results are shown below in Tables 2 to 4.
The results for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were not significant.
Hypothesis 3 was supported as there was a positive and statistically
significant correlations between rivalry between strategic networks and
increases in subsequent patenting activities (ρ = .39, p < .05).
6. Discussion
The lack of significant results for two of the three hypotheses have a
number of potential explanations. One explanation centers on the
measures used, particularly the rivalry measure. Slightly adapted from
prior studies, the rivalry measure is built on the notion of concentration
as a driver of rivalry. At a firm level, this is appropriate. However, we
identified that there was very little stability in the structure of the
networks. In some instances more than half of the firms in our sample
concerning the US market were deemed to be part of a single network
(with there being as few as three networks in place), whereas in other
years, firms were distributed across a greater number of networks and
in a more equal fashion. In this industry, many alliances were relatively
short-term as they covered technology transfer, outsourcing production
or joint component development. This rapid shifting of alliance partners
sits in contrast to other industries where the strategic networks are very
stable such as those where networks of firms coalesce around particular
technology standards such as mobile phone network systems (Galvin &
Rice, 2008).
The result of this instability was that the rivalry measure varied
enormously due to the large changes in concentration as the strategic
network composition altered. The rivalry measure considered market
share of the total market within a particular market segment, but even
though individual manufacturer's sales did not vary enormously, when
assessed relative to the total sales in a particular market segment, this
relative number was very inconsistent. A graph of total sales (see Fig. 1
below) across all manufacturers relative to total patents across the in-
dustry for each year of the study shows a much higher degree of sta-
bility than the network rivalry measure was able to produce.
In coding each alliance in the industry, it became clear that firms
entered alliances for a variety of reasons and that there were significant
differences in the alliance relationships across the industry both in
terms of relationship strength and in respect of the strategic logic for
the alliance. Firms thus differed in the degree to which they became
embedded in an ‘opportunity structure’ that delivered greater access to
strategic resources. For example, firms may engage in joint R&D efforts,
share particular technology, pursue second source agreements, know-
how and patenting agreements or even simple distribution agreements.
Many of these alliances may be relatively short-term in nature before a
new set of alliances are pursued to meet different strategic imperatives
that are relevant at the time.
When Gomes-Casseres (1994) suggested that firm versus firm
competition may be superseded by group versus group (or in the terms
of this research, strategic network versus strategic network), he made
Table 2
Results of Bivariate Correlations: Change in Patents and Change in Rivalry
1 2
1. Change in Patents 1.000
2. Change in Rivalry -.004 1.00
Table 3
Results of Bivariate Correlations: Change in Rivalry and Change in Price
1 2
1. Change in Rivalry 1.000
2. Change in Price -.235 1.00
Table 4
Results of Bivariate Correlations: Change in Rivalry Between Networks and
Total Patents for the Entire Network
1 2
1. Change in Rivalry Between Networks 1.000
2. Total Patents for the Entire Network .394* 1.00
⁎ p < .05
P. Galvin, et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 161 (2020) 120253
6
reference to fairly stable alliance networks – formal airline alliance
structures. The core players of OneWorld, Star Alliance and Sky Team
have changed little in more than two decades. In such an environment,
it may make sense to direct competitive moves towards direct rivals and
seek to limit the impact of such moves on alliance partners. However, in
the case of the motor vehicle industry, this instability in respect of al-
liances means all firms are likely to seek alliance partners that help
them achieve short-term goals, but that these cooperative relationships
that will improve their position with regard to specific firm needs, do
not affect their choices concerning competitive actions – a classic case
of co-opetition.
There were examples of firms being in the same strategic network
throughout the study, but this tended to occur in the case of very strong
relationships such as the case of Ford owning 33.4% of Mazda during
the period for which data was collected. In these cases, the specific
market segments being targeted and the positioning of the product may
have accounted for the long-term strong strategic alliances in place, but
such relationships were very much in the minority across the industry
and thus this phenomena could not be demonstrated empirically.
However, beyond the measurement issues and the instability of the
networks, the results may have a more simple theoretical explanation.
The first two hypotheses drew upon industrial organization (IO) eco-
nomics arguments aligned with the ‘structure, conduct, performance’
paradigm whereby the structure of the industry (e.g. number of players)
will impact the conduct of the business (e.g. their competitive actions).
Drawing upon this work, our hypotheses are extensions of the basic
principle that increased rivalry in an industry will drive increased levels
of competition.
What IO economics does not consider is the potential for coopera-
tion in the form of alliances and competition to occur simultaneously.
Best addressed through the concept of co-opetition, it has been sug-
gested that cooperation and competition are not necessarily at opposite
ends of the same continuum and may actually constitute different axes
of models concerning competitive behaviour (Chin, Chan & Lam, 2007;
Dorn, Schweiger & Albers, 2016; Lado et al., 1997). Thus extensive
alliances between various firms within a strategic network may not
actually reduce the degree to which these firms compete with each
other head to head. The difference between firms’ competitive actions
with respect of their network partners may not differ to their compe-
titive actions relative to players in other networks. Just because firms
have a strategic alliance in place does not mean that they will alter their
competitive actions. Within the co-opetition literature cases are often
presented where cooperation occurs in early stages of the value chain
(e.g. research and development, sourcing of components, sharing
technology) but firms continue to engage in highly competitive beha-
vior in product markets against their alliance partners (Gnyawali et al.,
2006; Osarenkhoe, 2010; Peng et al., 2012). Thus, we suggest that an
explanation for the findings may centre around the fact that while co-
operation was clearly visible through a multitude of alliances, firms
remained independent actors who pursued their competitive strategies
with minimal regard for their alliance partners.
The third hypothesis was supported suggesting that even if the in-
stability of individual members of a strategic network limits the po-
tential relationship between rivalry and competitive reactions, when
considered at an aggregate level, there is some correlation between
competitive actions at the network level and patenting activity. While
the strategic networks were not stable with many of the smaller players
moving into and out of the strategic networks, the reality is that the
networks tended to center around the largest players who featured in
the bulk of the alliances. These larger players (with higher levels of
patenting activity) were more stable in their strategic network mem-
bership such that they tended to operate as central players in a network
and not join the networks of other very large players. The innovation
did not need to occur in all members of the strategic network as rivalry
increased and in fact, small players may join the network to access the
R&D of the larger players. Thus, at an aggregate level, as rivalry in-
creased for the network as a whole, there was a corresponding increase
of patenting (using lagged data) when considered at the network level.
Co-opetition is still likely as all firms may compete vigorously in pro-
duct markets, but longer term investments in R&D (as measured via
patents) may alter across the network as the central network players
(who contribute the majority of the patents) adjust their R&D efforts
according to the structure and make-up of the different networks and
the resultant network rivalry.
Given the limited results, it is worth questioning the utility of the
strategic network concept. Work to date has largely concerned the
structure (ie centrality, structural holes) of strategic networks and
subsequent behaviour of firms. In terms of the field of competitive
dynamics, without a relatively high degree of network stability, the
impact of strategic networks on firms’ actions and reactions may be
limited. Certainly, presuming that the competitive characteristics that
define singular inter-firm relationships would spill-over to encompass
the entire horizontal network to the point that strategic networks may
compete as collective competitive units against other networks within
industry environments is not currently empirically supported.
Furthermore, the cooperative dimension may actually have limited
impact upon the direction and strength of competitive actions as sug-
gested by co-opetition scholars. Nevertheless, there were some notable
effects when considering the data in aggregated (ie. Hypothesis three)
and thus, in the same way that strategic groups provide with an addi-
tional level of insight concerning otherwise heterogeneous patterns of
firms behaviour (Tywoniak, Galvin & Davies, 2007), so too may
Fig. 1. Total Sales and Total Patents by Year
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strategic networks under the right conditions.
Perhaps the other significant challenge in suggesting strategic net-
works may orchestrate their competitive behaviors against members of
other strategic networks is that without some form of overarching
governance structure, firms are left to engage in sensemaking of other
firms behaviors to determine how they may react (Simsek, Lubatkin &
Floyd, 2003). The effectiveness of firm signalling and sensemaking is a
likely constraint to significant coordination of competitive behaviors.
Overall, our results attained in this research further extends our
understanding of the competitive dynamics associated with collabora-
tion and its impact upon innovation levels. Much of existing knowledge
is grounded in industrial economics and operates at the industry level
(Park & Zhou, 2005). With relatively few studies occurring at the firm
level (Ang, 2008), the role that other firms play in determining the focal
firm's behaviour is often under-emphasized (Chuang et al., 2018; Park &
Zhou, 2005). Alliances play a major role in allowing firms to overcome
resource constraints, however, with whom these alliances and formed
and the pattern of these alliances across an industry would seem to have
relatively little impact upon the competitive actions pursued by aligned
firms. To this extent, any shift from firm versus firm level rivalry to
network versus network rivalry would seem to have limited impact
upon innovation outcomes. Thus, while some authors have suggested
rivalry may help to drive innovation (e.g. Athreye, 2001; Carlin et al.,
2004) the presence or otherwise of this rivalry at a network level is
unlikely to form a major consideration in respect of innovation policy.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we consider issues pertinent to innovation policy, not
at the level of national innovation systems, but rather at the level of
inter-firm dynamics and how rivalry and competition may impact the
economic system. Positioning our focus on competitive dynamics (Chen
& Miller, 2015) we recognize that firms engage in competitive beha-
viour whereby an action by one firm elicits a reaction from other firms.
The manner in which competitive dynamics plays out in different in-
dustries and under different conditions (e.g. multi-market competition,
oligopolistic industries) has received considerable attention (e.g. Chen
& Miller, 2015; Ferrier & Lee, 2002; Kim & Parke, 2009). In this paper,
we continue this theme, recognizing that patterns of competition are
not homogeneous and thus firms will pursue competitive actions and
respond in different ways according to the prevailing alliances in the
industry. However, we take an alternative approach and introduce the
concept of strategic networks to investigate whether the locus of com-
petition may shift from firm-level interaction to network-level inter-
actions. Specifically, we consider whether the level of between network
rivalry impacts the competitive responses of different firms. We also
take a different approach to considering possible reactions by in-
vestigating more than just a product market variable (changes in price)
but also a factor market variable (patenting activities).
The results were non-significant in respect of two of the three hy-
potheses, though we did find that the lagged patent data for an entire
network correlated with the between network rivalry measure. In es-
sence, not all firms may alter their patenting activity in response to the
rivalry they face from firms in other networks, but as a totality, the
strategic network does respond. Through the network and the multitude
of strategic alliances that are in place, firms are able to leverage R&D
generated by some firms.
However, what became clear given the dynamism of the networks
when assessed at two-yearly intervals was that the strategic alliances
were often relatively short-term, and in many cases, quite operational
rather than strategic. Market access, distribution agreements, second
sourcing agreements all featured frequently. As the networks changed
significantly over the course of the study, the results are suggestive of a
high level of co-opetition. Firms cooperate in the early stages of the
value chain, but in many cases continue to compete with their alliance
partners. Observing the make-up of the strategic networks over 15 years
shows that some firms continued to work together over the entire
period, and it is these firms that are more likely to account for their
alliance partners in respect of their competitive actions and reactions.
The theoretical contribution of this research is that changes in the
level of rivalry between different strategic networks does not correlate
with changes if firm behavior in respect of pricing or innovation;
however, changes in the level of rivalry are associated with changes in
innovation at the network level. Whilst theoretically, strategic networks
should impact the degree of rivalry within an industry and the sub-
sequent actions and reactions that this rivalry creates, overall, our re-
sults suggest that at least in terms of the motor vehicle industry, stra-
tegic networks tend not to operate in a collective manner when it comes
to competitive actions and reactions, or at best this effect is very weak.
Inter-network rivalry will theoretically be strongest if all participant
members of a network are aware of their affiliation as the potential for
social control and incentive alignment will be most effective if firms
understand the make-up of their network and thus who to target via
such behavior (Sonenshein, Nault & Obodaru, 2017). With the alliances
varying in strength and with the composition of the networks changing
rapidly, it is possible that firms were not clear as to whom they were
most closely aligned and whether they were strategically committed to
their network partners. The presence of multiple low-level inter-
dependency alliances (for example distribution or marketing alliances)
may somewhat muddy our ability to discern the strong (and potentially
competitive action inducing) relationships (Zhang & Zhang, 2006).
From a policy perspective, the logic that extensive alliances across
the industry would lessen rivalry and thereby reduce pressures to in-
novate does not seem to have occurred. While some firms do not seem
to alter their patenting behavior in the face of increased rivalry, at the
entire network level, there is a competitive response and thus innova-
tion is not compromised by the presence of the strategic networks. In
essence, policy-makers should not view a multitude of strategic alli-
ances in an industry as a threat to competition and there does not seem
to be evidence of such alliances compromising innovation outcomes at
an industry level.
Beyond the challenges of distinguishing between different forms of
alliances, a further limitation relates to the measure of rivalry employed
and the method of network formation. In regard to the rivalry measure,
the use of the modified Herfindahl index elicited both benefits and
weaknesses in application. The benefits of this measure include the
capacity to use the real production figures of each firm in conjunction
with specific product market participation of each firm. In this respect,
this measure provides for a sound representation of what level of rivalry
one firm faces from other firms participating in the same product
market segment. The principal weakness associated with this measure is
that as a concentration derived measure that considers the market share
of one strategic network in a market segment relative to the market
share of participants from other strategic networks (less the focal firm's
own market share), the rapid changing of strategic network member-
ship resulted in rapidly changing between network rivalry measures. At
a more macro level, such a measure also brings with it weaknesses in
the form of the inability to incorporate dynamic elements such as tit-
for-tat rivalry, marketing strategies and competitive attacks in terms of
instigating price competition between firms.
Moving forward, there are certainly opportunities to consider the
impact of strategic networks on competitive dynamics in industries
where the networks are far more stable such as airlines and technology
products where competitors tend to coalesce around particular tech-
nological standards. Alternatively, rather than being restricted to spe-
cific alliance networks, given the convergence of technology in this and
other industries, it may be appropriate to adopt a wider con-
ceptualization of the relationships in-play and apply an ecosystems lens
to better understand firm behaviors in respect of actions and reactions.
Irrespective of how groups of firms are considered, a potentially fruitful
path forward in better understanding firm's competitive behaviors may
be through the way that we approach firm actions and reactions.
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Competitive dynamics studies to date have tended to concern them-
selves with actions and reactions concerning product market factors.
The focus has been almost exclusively upon price and market entry/
presence (Chen & Miller, 2012). But competition also occurs in factor
markets and while reactions to competitors’ actions may not be as
immediately noticeable, extending the principle of action and reaction
would do well to consider reactions such as acquiring new strategic
resources or even major investments in brand development. That is
linking network rivalry to the acquisition and development of new re-
sources or investment in learning to build dynamic capabilities may
present significant opportunities. Quite possibly, the consideration of
factor market responses would provide a clearer picture concerning the
manner in which competitive dynamics plays out across industries and
the impact upon innovation.
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